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Abstract

We investigate the cross scalar linkages between every day violence and global war on terror in the context of urban Pakistan. We draw upon an extensive and intensive research undertaken in the twin cities of Rawalpindi/Islamabad and Karachi to highlight how marginalized Pashtun and Bengali Rohingya communities experience state and everyday violence in the context of the global war on terror. Focusing on the gendered aspects of infrastructural and spectacular violence, we argue that every day violence too, is deeply politicised and inflected by national and global level geopolitics. Following Hannah Arendt we conceptualize violence as a manifestation of a loss of power. Accordingly, drawing upon ethnographic evidence we demonstrate how even domestic violence takes on a public and a political valence. We argue that performances of masculinities and femininities are, in fact, imbricated with geographies of exclusion, marginalization and state policies. The routinization of violence in everyday spaces draws attention to the DNA like relationality of the local with the geopolitical at the global and national scales.

Keywords	Infrastructural violence; spectacular violence; gender; war on terror; Pakistan
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Submission Files Included in this PDF

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ResponsePGAnonymous3.docx [Response to Reviewers (without Author Details)]

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KING'S College LONDON
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December 25th, 2017

To: Phil Steinberg
Editor in Chief, *Political Geography*

Dear Phil,

I hope that this communication finds you in good health. I am writing to submit the manuscript titled, 'Gender, Global Terror, and Everyday Violence in Urban Pakistan'. My other two co-authors in this manuscript are Drs. Nausheen Anwar and Amiera Sawas.

The manuscript is based upon original research and is not under consideration for publication anywhere else. Some of the material in the manuscript was previously used in the final project report by Social Policy Development Research Centre (SPDC), Karachi, Pakistan, to the donor IDRC.

We do hope that the reviewers find the manuscript worthy of publication. Looking forward to a positive outcome of the review process, I remain,

Yours Sincerely



Daanish Mustafa
Reader in Politics and Environment

Antonis Vradis
The Associate Editor
Political Geography

Subject: Resubmission of a revised version of Manuscript Ref: JPGQ_2017_376

Dear Dr Vradis,

Thanks again for sharing the third set comments of the anonymous reviewers on our revised manuscript titled, 'Gender, global terror and everyday violence in urban Pakistan'. As the lead author I went over the concluding section and eliminated the discussion of the PTM, which to my mind tied in the discussion to an urgent and present mass movement in Pakistan. This perhaps would have been a lot more interesting to a Pakistani audience, though I can see that the international audience of *Political Geography* may benefit more from a stronger revisiting of the link between the empirical and the theoretical framework of the article. Accordingly, I have added a full paragraph more directly tying in the evidence presented with specific aspects of the DNA model of the relationship between the everyday and the geopolitical.

I hope that the new paragraph adequately pulls together the empirical and the theoretical parts of the article. I appreciate the time that the anonymous reviewer and you have devoted to improving the quality of this article. I hope that the revisions fulfill your expectations. And apologies for the oversight on track changes and a few very irritating typos in the paper, which I have eliminated to the best of my, quite inadequate, ability for noticing detail.

Gender, Global Terror, and Everyday Violence in Urban Pakistan

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Abstract

We investigate the cross scalar linkages between every day violence and global war on terror in the context of urban Pakistan. We draw upon intensive research undertaken in the twin cities of Rawalpindi/Islamabad and Karachi to highlight how marginalized Pashtun and Bengali Rohingya communities experience state and everyday violence in the context of the global war on terror. Focusing on the gendered aspects of infrastructural and spectacular violence, we argue that every day violence too, is deeply politicised and inflected by national and global level geopolitics. Following Hannah Arendt, we conceptualize violence as a manifestation of a loss of power. Accordingly, drawing upon ethnographic evidence we demonstrate how even domestic violence takes on a public and a political valence. We argue that performances of masculinities and femininities are, in fact, imbricated with geographies of exclusion, marginalization and state policies. The routinization of violence in everyday spaces draws attention to the DNA like relationality of the local with the geopolitical at the global and national scales.

Key Words: Infrastructural violence, spectacular violence, gender, GWOT, Pakistan

Introduction

Terror is geographical (Mustafa 2005), just as violence is socio-spatial (Blomley 2003, Tyner 2012). How does the global scale geography of terrorism and the so called 'War' on it, intersect with the texture of everyday violent spaces? It is a live question, which has been engaged with conceptually (e.g., Pain 2014), but rarely been grounded in empirical evidence. The question becomes particularly germane to spaces at the periphery of the global structures of power, like Pakistan which are, in fact, at the epicenter of the neo-realist, militarist geopolitics of anti-terrorism, and its well-known manifestation the 'global war on terror' (GWOT) (Rashid 2009). The blow back of the GWOT on Pakistan is not just limited to suicide bombings, drone attacks and more dramatic acts of violence, but we argue, also in the texture of everyday spaces and the violence experienced therein. The Pakistani state's involvement in the war on terror intersects with the societal changes wrought by consumerist neo-liberalism under the conditions of late capitalism (Mustafa and Sawas 2014, Maqsood 2013) to spawn deeply gendered, violent geographies. We use the case studies of two urban areas of Rawalpindi/Islamabad and the megalopolis of Karachi, to understand how international scale geopolitics of GWOT, along with consumerist neoliberalism, refract the production, and gendered experiences of everyday violent spaces in urban Pakistan. Rawalpindi/Islamabad, a medium sized conurbation, represents the best that the Pakistan has to offer in urbanity, and Karachi the greatest urban challenge.

In investigating the gendered geography of every day violence, we do not limit ourselves to equating concern with gender to be with women alone. In fact, we are concerned with both femininities and masculinities and how constructions and performances of both make one susceptible to violence (Srivastava 2012, Datta 2012). Therefore, while being attentive to feminist insights on violence (e.g., see Pain 2014, Staehli *et al*. 2004, Staehli and Nagel 2008, Bhattacharya 2008, Kirby 2013), we cast a more inclusive net, by asking what are the dynamic interactions between masculinities, femininities, and different types of violence--from spectacular terrorist violence to, more routinized criminal, state and infrastructural violence. We use the term infrastructural violence, which we define as how the design and access, or lack thereof, to the urban infrastructure may be directly linked to violent outcomes (Rogers and O'Neill 2012; Ferguson 2012). Also, we understand violence in its physical sense following Mitchell (1996) of either the actuality of physical harm or threat thereof, either gratuitously, or to proscribe someone's behavior. We deliberately made the choice of engaging *with* violence in its physical sense, and not in its equally legitimate, and perhaps conceptually richer abstract sense (Galtung 1969, Tyner and Inwood 2014). This is primarily because, the empirical case studies where even the somewhat narrower physical understanding of violence had such a loud resonance in social life, just engaging violence in its crass physical form seemed a daunting enough task of framing and explanation.

We focus on the case studies of two of the poorest and most vulnerable neighborhoods of Ali Akbar Shah Goth (AASG) and Afghan Basti in Karachi and Islamabad, respectively (Anwar *et al*. 2017). AASG is an informal settlement grown around what was previously a fishing village, in Union Council Ibrahim Hyderi, right next to Pakistan's second biggest port of Bin Qasim in eastern Karachi (Figure 1). The estimated 60,000 strong population of Ali Akbar Shah Goth is dominated by Burmese Rohingyas and other Bengali-speaking fisher communities. Afghan

Basti in Islamabad (Figure 2), was an informal squatter settlement primarily with a population of approximately 8000 Pashtu speaking Pashtun migrants from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province of Pakistan, and some smattering of Afghan refugees. The settlement was bulldozed by the authorities in the name of security in August 2015, with the plea that the residents were not Pakistanis, but instead Afghan refugees who harbored terrorist and criminal elements (Zahid 2015, Saleemi 2015). The ethno-linguistic minority character of the population of the two neighborhoods, and how that character intersected with the state narrative about terror, security, and citizenship forms the fulcrum of our analysis of the linkages between GWOT and everyday violence in the two cities.



Figure 1: Location of Bin Qasim Town and Ali Akbar Shah Goth (see red circle) in Karachi



Figure 2: Location of Afghan Basti (I-11/4 – see red circle) in Islamabad.

From Global Terror to Everyday Violence

The GWOT terminology may have gone out of fashion with the passing on of the Bush administration in the United States, but the actual practices of militarist counter terrorism continued with all the vigour in the West and South Asia, under the Obama administration (Shaw and Akhter 2012 & 2014). Now with the rise of even more virulent xenophobic and Islamophobic politics in the West, the future for GWOT like geopolitics seems perilously bright. The GWOT was, and continues to be a practice of geopolitics predicated upon a state centric model of the world (Dalby 2003), and binary geographical imaginaries (Stephens 2011). It was also a practice of geopolitics that was about place making, defining a hierarchy of spaces and representing actors as de-territorialized threats, which must be confronted without regard to the territorial boundaries of sovereign states, on the plea that 'fragile states' were not able to exercise their sovereignty in those spaces (Flint and Radil 2007, Elden 2007, Coleman 2003). The overt military interventions of the United States and its Western allies have been discussed and critiqued extensively in the literature (e.g. see Anderson 2011, Gregory 2010, Gregory and Pred 2006, Jones and Clarke 2006, Ettlinger and Bosco 2004), especially with regard to Pakistan and Afghanistan (e.g. see Shaw and Akhter 2014, Hussain 2010, O'Loughlin *et al.* 2010). The non-military, but directly and indirectly security related aspects of GWOT have also gained some attention, e.g., border controls (Amoore 2006), financial transactions (Amoore and Goede 2008) and leveraging of fear to attack domestic opponents and movements (Woon 2011), to name a few. In the case of Pakistan, however, the non-military and indirectly security related consequences of the GWOT are less well

understood and documented, particularly as they link to the everyday and the mundane violent spaces (for exceptions see Flury 2011, Ahmed and Avoine 2018).

Everyday violence and violent geographies, meanwhile have started gaining increasing attention from geographers (e.g., see McIlwaine 1999, Gregory and Pred 2007, Mehta and Bondi 2010, and Tyner and Inwood 2014) and from the international development community of practice (e.g., see Anwar et al. 2015, WHO 1996). The everyday violence has an inescapable gender dimension to it, much the same as everything else in social life, and hence everyday violence and violent geographies cannot possibly be parsed without engaging with the attendant gender fault lines and contestations (Brickell and Maddrell 2016, Pain 2015). The policy engagement with the question of global and domestic terrorism, and then everyday violence is scale delimited, where each of the categories match with static macro-global, meso-national and sub-national and micro-local scales, respectively (Flint and Radil 2007). Concomitantly, the macro and micro are imbued with political valence and meaning, whilst the local is often (perhaps unhelpfully) deemed to be apolitical and more in the realm of criminal and domestic violence (Katz 2007, Pain 2015). It is well understood that scale is not an *a priori* category but an outcome of socio-spatial processes where geographical scales change, intersect and are in fact, produced for deeply politicized reasons (Hewitt 2001, Smith 1984, Legg 2009 and for a critique also see Marston et al. 2005).

Feminist geographers in a somewhat comparable register have argued for paying attention to how everyday violence is complicated and enabled by entrenched inequalities and intersectionalities cutting across spatial scales (Pain and Staehli 2014, Dowler 2012). Toxic masculinist geopolitics, for example, that may instigate wars motivated by the savior complex are not irrelevant to the toxic masculinities that play out in the everyday, across the so-called East and West, North and South, here and there divide (Flury 2009 & 2011, Dowler 2012, Pain 2014). As Pain and Smith (2008) argue; events, encounters, affects, cultural tropes, ideologies and politics that connect and permeate geopolitics and everyday life, do not have a stable hierarchical structure. In fact, the linkages are characterized by instabilities, discontinuities and unexpected configurations that constantly co-produce everyday life and geopolitics. Hence, the image of the DNA like relationality of global geopolitics, specifically GWOT and everyday violent spaces that we invoke here for our case study of Karachi and Islamabad (Also see Pain 2014). The image of the DNA to our mind best captures scalar, affective, functional and political entanglements between the global capital, militarism and the gendered corporeal experiences of violence in everyday spaces (e.g., also see Fluri and Piedalue 2017, Fluri 2011 and Pain 2015, Maqsood 2013).

Our discussion and interpretation of violence is rooted in our theorization of it, following Arendt (1973) as symptomatic of a loss of power. The 'knowledge/power' flowing from the actors' socialization into webs of knowledge and discourses that induce internalization of certain social relations and world views as natural and desirable (Foucault, 1980) is the most comprehensive form of power. It is the loss of this type of power, that we maintain following Arendt (1973) underlies violence, and not as a tactic that accrues more power to the perpetrator (e.g. Mustafa 2002).

As mentioned above, we consider three types of violence, (1) spectacular terrorist violence that destroys or transforms geographical places and spaces (Mustafa, 2005a; Gregory & Pred,

2007); (2) geographical places and infrastructure therein that enable violence (Lefebrve, 1991; Anand, 2012; Ferguson, 2012); and (3) structural violence (Galtung, 1969). We focus on the first two, as they by themselves present enough of a conceptual challenge of linking theory with evidence in this paper. While the first type of terrorist violence has been typically conceptualized at the international geopolitical and then at the nation state scale, we nevertheless consider local manifestations of it—everyday spectacular violence that changes the texture of spaces and places. The second type of violence that we call 'infrastructural violence' draws attention, to how prison camps, surveillance and police presence, for example, may produce carceral geographies associated with the state oppression on the one hand (e.g. see Hewitt 2001), and design of urban living spaces, which may perpetuate gendered isolation, confinement or social alienation on the other (Ferguson 2012, Scott 1998). We will demonstrate through our case studies the scalar linkages between terrorist and infrastructural violence, and how the experience of them intersects with gendered identities and expectations.

Pakistan is a federal republic comprising four provinces: Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Punjab, Sindh and Baluchistan. Since independence from British rule in 1947, Pakistan has relied on centralized structures of federal governance. Its bureaucracy and military elites have copied the institutional and organizational style of the colonial state (Jalal 1995) with little room for democratic articulation. Authoritarian tradition and military rule have shaped the structures of governance. This has meant not only an unabashed reliance on centralized, elite-backed visions, but also the undermining of democratic politics (Abbas 2005, Siddiqa 2011a). But despite a democratic turn since 2008 at the provincial and national scale, governance structures at the local and city scale which paradoxically had been devolved and democratized under the semi-military regime from 2001-2008, were in fact rolled back by the new democratic dispensations. Some argued that it was to ensure continuation of patronage politics by provincial and national level politicians (Mustafa and Sawas 2013, Akhter 2017).

The Pakistani state's role in the GWOT and related security policies, further complicate domestic politics and matters of urban governance. Pakistan has been the main ally of the United States since the start of the war on Al Qaeda and other terrorist outfits in 2001. With time, Pakistan's role has become more important due to the threats in Afghanistan that have also expanded into Pakistan (Siddiqa 2011b). At the outset of the GWOT Pakistan found itself under a military regime of General Pervaiz Musharraf with limited political legitimacy. The military ruler of Pakistan at the time, chose to align himself with the ethno-nationalist Mutahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) in urban Sindh, including Karachi, to shore up his political support in the governance structure he had put in place (Gayer 2014, Anwar 2014, Verkaaik 2004). The MQM is a secular leaning party representing the Urdu speaking people (known as Mohajirs) who had migrated from, what is now, India at the time of independence in 1947. General Musharraf was from the same community in Karachi. The party had established a monopoly of political power, especially in Karachi earlier on, and was often accused of supporting criminal enterprises. It had been the subject of a military operation in the 1990s, but was rehabilitated by the Musharraf regime (Gayer 2007). The party is also often touted to be strongly aligned with Western intelligence agencies whose interests converged with its secular leanings, and the GWOT imperatives of the government of Pakistan. The result was the state turning a blind eye to its criminal activities in return for it denying space to religiously aligned political parties and interests, in particular the Pashtun migrants in Karachi. According

to Verkaaik (2016), ethnic identity politics and violence in urban Sindh have often gone hand in hand since the 1970s, with MQM in particular seeking to portray itself as a violent "militant group willing to fight for the rights of Muhajirs" (p: 851). As Anwar (2014) documents in case of AASG, the Bengali and Rohinga population of the locality were pressed into service by the MQM in the 1990s as part of the vote bank politics. Subsequent to the delegitimation of the same peoples' citizenship in the securitized environment after 911, MQM induced them to work for the party with a vague promise of getting them back their citizenship rights.

As threats of militancy peaked in the later part of 2000s, even under the civilian dispensation, the military assumed control of the national plan to address terrorism, and through amendments in the Citizenship Act and Foreigners Ordinance, the state proceeded to disenfranchise many ethnic minorities (Anwar 2013, Rumi 2015). A series of military operations were launched targeting militants in Pakistan's northern regions, bordering Afghanistan, and in urban centers such as Karachi. In 2013, an extensive para-military Rangers' operation was launched in Karachi to 'cleanse' the city from terrorists. This time, the military took on the MQM for the second time, under the pretext that its criminal violence was in fact, at the behest of the arch rival India. These operations have visibly brought down levels of non-state violence and crime in Karachi (Rehman 2017), hence the process has facilitated the remit of state violence to expand. The Pashtuns and other ethnic minorities with dubious credentials of Pakistaniness, e.g., the Rohingyas and the Bengalis, were further victimized as a result of the new operations (Anwar 2013, Baloch and Mughal 2017). The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) has reported an increased number of civilian deaths in Karachi due to 'encounter killings' [1] and arbitrary detention (Ahmed 2017). Alongside this, the Pakistani state is now expelling hundreds of thousands of Afghan refugees, many of whom have lived in Pakistan for nearly 40 years. Deportation threats, and police abuses have pushed out 365,000 of Pakistan's 1.5 million registered Afghan refugees, and over 20,000 of the estimated one million undocumented refugees. The Pakistani state's conflation of refugees with terrorism is being used to justify the policy of forced expulsions (Alimia 2017). But even beyond the Afghan refugees, even the internally displaced people from Pakistan's former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) are being rolled up in the anti-Afghan operations.

In addition to the above, new infrastructure projects under the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which has become a national theme, are also legitimizing state control. The CPEC is providing legitimacy for army interventions that cover everything from long-standing suspicions towards 'outsiders' to the history of militancy and everyday violence in Pakistan. In August 2016, then Chief of Army Staff General Raheel Sahrif declared a suicide attack on a hospital in Quetta an attack on CPEC which "enemies of the country" wanted to sabotage (Dawn 2016). Hence, in Karachi and Rawalpindi/Islamabad, the different and overlapping permutations of violence unfold in the broader context of state policies that are deeply enmeshed in the security related aspects of the GWOT on the one hand, and desire for foreign investments (mostly Chinese) to facilitate capitalist development, on the other.

The wider project on which this manuscript is based, undertook approximately 2,445 questionnaire surveys, close to 60 ethnographic style interviews, participant observations,

[1] People killed in 'encounters' with personnel of law enforcement agencies

participatory photography, media monitoring, secondary literature review and some key informant interviews in 12 working class urban neighborhoods of Rawalpindi/Islamabad conurbation and Karachi. In AASG and Afghan Basti, 445 and 129 semi-structured questionnaires were administered, along with six detailed ethnographic style interviews in each neighborhood, respectively. The project has focused on the material and discursive drivers of gender roles and their relevance to configuring violent geographies, but along the way the linkages and symbiosis with the GWOT and state policies emerged as salient contributors to violence, especially in the two communities. Unfortunately, we did not have any transgender people in our sample, hence we must limit ourselves to the discussion of masculinities and femininities in the following section, to set the context for a discussion of the relationship between GWOT and everyday violence in the following section.

Masculinities and Femininities in Violent Spaces

Gender roles are enacted and embodied, and the repetitive enactment of those gives them the appearance of normality or even naturalness. But they have to be enacted somewhere, and the question of where and the spatiality thereof is, in fact, integral to the question of gender (Halvorson 2005, Falah and Nagel 2005; Bondi, 2005). In the two neighborhoods of AASG and former Afghan Basti, femininities and masculinities, end up being discursively constructed and materially enacted in spatially diverse idioms and practices. The Pashtun dominated Afghan Basti's population is mostly comprised of either rural migrants from KP, and some internally displaced families from FATA who had existing connections in the area with prior migrants. The dominant idiom for articulating masculinity and hence its binary opposite femininity was ethnic, i.e., we must behave or believe the way we do, because we are Pashtun, e.g.,

> Madam, do not get angry but we, Pathans are a little orthodox. We do not allow our women to work except the chores within the house. We do not allow them to go outside. I only do this hard work so that I can feed my children. If I am fulfilling their needs, then why do women need to work? [see Figure 6] (Male Respondent A, Afghan Basti Circa 2014 to the female researchers).

> We are Pashtun and we don't believe in the concept of love marriage. My marriage was totally arranged, and my in-laws were our relatives. My husband was my first cousin, that's why I married here (Female respondent A, Afghan Basti, Circa 2014).

> No, we don't allow our females to go out for work in any case. Unlike Punjabi people we can starve but we cannot let our women earn. It is our insult (Male respondent B, Afghan Basti, Circa 2014).

> As we Pashtun people say in our language, 'Woman is either for the home or for the grave' (Male respondent ISL-AA-75, Afghan Basti, Circa 2014)

Pashtun masculinity has been a source of considerable scholarly and popular attention and has been celebrated in an almost orientalist register as that of a noble savage. The colonial constructions of Pashtuns were not divorced from their fairer complexion and the racist

construction of them as a martial race (e.g. see Caroe 1958). The contemporary Pakistani society externally, and the Pashtun nationalists' and intellectuals' internal self-image of the Pashtun men is that of proud, independent and martial people (e.g. see Khan 1993). The martial race myth was liberally leveraged during the Afghan war against the Soviets by the Pakistani state and its U.S. and Saudi allies to mobilize Afghan Pashtuns, as well as the Pakistani Pashtuns to participate in the Jihad against the Soviet infidels (Allan 2001, Malik 2016). The same constructions contemporaneously are frequently used by the Pakistani right and the left to frame their views of the GWOT, Taliban insurgency, drone attacks and the American role in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Such essentialization of ethnic identity is problematic on many counts and its authenticity is irrelevant, insofar as these discourses end up producing and reproducing social practice in profoundly problematic ways. Misogyny is one of the common outcomes of such constructions of hyper-masculinity and the Pashtun society is no exception (Ahmad and Avoine 2015).

The mostly illiterate population of Afghan Basti had not necessarily read all of these accounts, but as documented by Titus (1998) such colonial stereotypes do have a legitimacy within ethnic groups in Pakistan, including the ethnicities that the stereotypes are about. The Pashtun masculinity is not exceptional in its misogynistic manifestation, especially among Pakistan's other ethnicities, e.g. for Punjabis (Partners4Prevention, undated), Shina (Halvorson 2005), Sindhi, and Baloch to name a few. But our Pashtun respondents' construction of masculinity was profoundly imbricated, to the extent of being almost a caricature, with the Pakistani state's and the colonial and post-colonial literature's representations of them (e.g. see Titus 1998). While more analytically scholastic historical and sociological accounts have introduced considerable nuance to the stereotype of the noble savage, and there is documented diversity in how Pashtun gender is enacted across space and time (e.g. see Kakar 2005), the popular culture continues to rabidly hold on to it. Many Pashtun and non-Pashtun observers have lamented the toxic legacy of this stereotype especially for gender relations (Manchanda 2015). Nevertheless, the stereotype along with the particular traumatized pathologies of an internally displaced, marginalized, poor and stigmatized population overlap to produce a particularly toxic brand of masculinity (for a comparable account see Achilli 2015). Gendered social practice in Afghan Basti, on the other hand is not just about women not having any agency, they continue to exercise considerable authority in terms of proscribing their men's behavior vis-à-vis second marriage or consorting with other women:

> *Brother in law of the Female respondent:* I try to make them understand to let us marry a girl from Islamabad but they don't let us do that
> *Female respondent:* that, as long as we [women] are alive, is not going to happen!
> *Researcher:* We thought Pashtun men are very dominant and they can go for second marriage without taking consent from their first wife?
> *Female respondent:* That is not the case. Where the hell will they go if they do that? I will not stand for my husband going for a second marriage! (Female respondent N, Afghan basti, Circa 2014).

Also, the gender roles are intertwined with multiple strands, mostly to do with the material conditions of poverty, exclusionary state policies and state violence, as discussed later in this paper.

In case of the Rohingya and Bengali people in AASG, the customary fisher livelihoods, coupled with the imperatives of living in the slum of a megalopolis seemed to have spawned contradictory gender roles, with discursive constructions even more conflicted with social practice. The predominantly Bengali and Rohingya community, still frames masculinities and femininities in comparable terms to the Pashtuns in a somewhat ethnic idiom to contrast themselves with their Urdu speaking (Mohajir) neighbors, e.g. when talking about neighborhood women organizing to go and protest against lack of water supply a respondent said:

> They might go, I do not know about them. My neighbour is a Mohajir. She tried to gather all the women to go for a protest. She often tells us that she has visited the water utility office, and the office people asked her to bring all the women so they have evidence of a lack of water supply, but we cannot go. Our husbands will not allow us, nor we will go. Like you are a Mohajir, you can go everywhere, we cannot [The Research Assistant was a Mohajir]. A Mohajir woman can share her husband's burden by working in the factory, a Bengali women cannot. We Bengali women will die of hunger but will never go to a protest. In our community, women freely roaming on the streets is not considered good. Husbands do not want their wives to mingle with other males, that is why we face so many restrictions (Woman respondent A, AASG, Karachi, 23/01/15)

But the gendered social practice is a lot more complex than the above quote would have us believe. The women are, almost universally engaged in commercial enterprises like weaving, carpet making etc. even if it is from home. Furthermore, the lack of education for the women is not so much because of a cultural proscription, but mostly because of the lack of affordability, poverty, and lack of safe transport options to access spaces of education. It is a routine occurrence within the community for young women to run away and marry young men of their own choice. The exercise of that choice, nevertheless exposes them to further violence, because the idiom of shame, and dishonor, although not able to proscribe their behavior, nevertheless, opens them to community and household opprobrium, often expressed violently, e.g.

> We had a fight and I separated [from my ex-husband]. So, I moved into my father's house. I lived there for a year. My ex-husband did not visit or support me financially. I bore my own expenses by again starting the 'adda work' (textile weaving workshop). But now I had to pay my father as well, more than I used to give him before. Nobody liked me, and in order to live in the same house I had to pay money to my father. My father said that I won't keep you in the house [because I ran away and married of my own choice]. I said I will work and pay you. He agreed to let me stay for the money but he beat me and insulted me all the time. . . I had to give money to my father and a younger brother, Hira baji [the local facilitator] knew him. He also used to beat me severely [for dishonouring the family]. It is because of these people that I got married [of my own accord] again (Female Respondent H, AASG, Karachi, 21/01/2015).

While the above account displays remarkable agency in terms of earning a livelihood and being able to make personal choices, it also demonstrates, how those choices are

nevertheless fraught with violence for women. For men too, living in a highly monetized commercial capital of the country, means different visions of what it means to be a man, e.g.,

> We Burmese-Bengali boys of 18-30 are confronting complex challenges. Our elders' and parents' livelihood was fishing--catch fish, distribute fish. The young people however, don't want to do this kind of work. They want to work during the day and stay at home at night. They don't want to go on the fishing boats that take you for 6 to 7 days out to the sea, and which require working day and night. They prefer working in factories like garments, hosiery etc. But even in these jobs there are serious challenges (Male respondent K, AASG, Karachi, 15/05/2015).

The above respondent was an enforcer for the MQM that perpetrated violence in his daily life. His view of what young people want was confirmed many times during the course of the questionnaire surveys and interviews. Clearly the masculinity is being recast in the context of a contemporary urban capitalist economy and the lifestyle ambitions that are consonant with that economy. But the question of ethnic identity, class and then the ambition to participate in the urban economy intersect with the Pakistani state's policies with respect to the GWOT, to spawn new geographies of gendered violence within these poor ethnic minority communities in Karachi and Islamabad. It is how the GWOT is integral to the 'serious challenges', what the above respondent calls *pareshani* (literally: worry) that we turn to in the next section.

The DNA relationality of Terror and Violence

The structure of the two urban areas offers interesting contrasts and convergences, by virtue of their commercial and more governmental primary functions. The commercial and Industrial hub of Karachi has a vast proportion of its population living in informal settlements, about 60% by some estimates (Hasan and Raza 2015), which provides the working proletariat for the industrial and commercial establishments in the city. AASG is one of the poorest and most vulnerable neighborhoods, which hosts such a working population that is transitioning from its traditional fishing based livelihoods to industrial labour, and home workshop style production (Askari 2015).

Afghan Basti was initially set up by Afghan refugees in the 1980s who found work in the nearby fruit and vegetable market as well as access to United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and other NGOs that were active in supporting the refugee population. That was also the time when Afghan refugees were favoured as symbolic of Pakistan's role as a loyal cold warrior against the Soviets in Afghanistan, and as evidence of its Islamic identity and solidarity with fellow Muslim Afghans. Over a period of time, the Afghan refugees were largely displaced by Pakistani economic migrants and then internally displaced people who had moved to the city from nearby Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province and the adjoining FATA. Both the neighbourhoods, according to our baseline survey, experienced extremely high levels of violence, both within the household and from perpetrators outside of it, 86% for Afghan abadi and paradoxically 67% in AASG reported being victims of violence. In AASG 19% of the respondents refused to answer the question about being subjected to violence. However, as we spent more time in the area, the research team did gain trust, and

triangulating with the ethnographic evidence, we learned that the violence levels were much higher than ended up being reported in through the questionnaire survey.

In Rawalpindi/Islamabad according to our survey, there was much higher proportion of within household violence reported. Indeed, because of the particularities of the social milieu in Karachi, the incidence of criminal violence was much higher than Rawalpindi/Islamabad and hence it eclipsed the domestic violence in people's consciousness. In reality, from our ethnographic evidence the incidence of domestic violence was just as high in Karachi as in Rawalpindi/Islamabad. Also, in AASG the respondents frequently referred to domestic violence in their neighborhood, even if they insisted that there was no such thing happening in their own household, e.g.,

> There is a family in a house adjacent to our home. They beat their daughter in law very badly. Couple of times I intervene to sort out the matter. One day they beat her so badly that she was not able to walk for a week." (Male BQ-375, Ali Akbar Shah Goth, Karachi, Circa 2015).

Even the supposedly private, domestic violence takes on a very public character in the lanes, and congested living quarters of the residents of the two neighbourhoods. The spectacle of the above type of violence and we would argue the cause for it, is not separate from the infrastructural context within which it actuates. We discuss each type of violence and the strands that connect local and global scale violence in the two subsections below.

Infrastructural Violence and the GWOT

Infrastructural violence (IV) is defined by Rogers and O'Neill (2012) in two forms. 'Passive' – is where there is an absence of key infrastructure (e.g. water, transport, education, housing) which, marginalises groups of people in terms of attaining their basic rights and being able to live life without being constantly distracted and anxious about attaining access to such infrastructure and services. 'Active' IV is where configurations of infrastructure are 'designed to be violent' by regulating normative social and territorial relations' (p. 406). Haines (2017), for example, demonstrates how IV has shifted from the passive register, where indigenous citizens were excluded through poor road networks, to the active in the discussion and development of a highway in Belize. The active IV again does not necessarily mean that there is a clear intent for the infrastructure to be a cause of violence. Instead, the very spatial configurations of the infrastructure, and who it caters to and not, and how violence flows from it is the pivotal question here.

In Pakistan, the state's narrative on its role in the GWOT vacillates between two contradictory but concurrent tropes—the dominant one is that terrorist violence within Pakistan is a conspiracy on part of the arch rival India, and its protégé Afghanistan to destabilize Pakistan. The second framing, favoured by the liberal intelligentsia but largely frowned upon by the state apparatus, especially the deep state, is that religious radicalization supported by the Saudi and Pakistani states to mobilize non-state actors to fight the Jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan, and then against the Indian Army in Kashmir, may be the cause of the violence (Abbas 2005, Siddiqa 2007). In the former framing the foreigners, e.g., the Afghan refugees and Burmese Rohingyas, for example, are the fifth column of the enemy. Therefore, the argument goes that, the state must tighten mechanisms for recognizing friend and foe, and

the main conduit for doing that is greater scrutiny of applicants for issuance of the Biometric Computerized National Identity Card (CNIC), especially of applicants belonging to ethnic minorities, whose Pakistaniness may be suspect (also see Anwar 2014). Institution of citizenship documents such as a CNIC is part of a continuum of state formation, but in case of South Asia that seemingly convenient exercise in making citizenship legible and numerate has morphed into an instrument of exclusion and securitization (e.g., see Fluri *et al*. 2015). This has implications in terms of passive IV because the CNIC is the currency of access to state infrastructure, and as we will illustrate is an important material strand linking local and global violence. With the increasing securitization of the Pakistani society, this extends to jobs, schools, hospitals, transport and any housing in the formal sector, and progressively even in the informal sector. Burmese Rohingyas, Bengali speaking Pakistanis as well as Pashtun Pakistanis—who share ethno-linguistic ties with Afghans, are at a particular disadvantage when it comes to getting CNICs, especially if they are poor. As one enforcer for MQM in AASG explained, his life choices of being an extortionist and a gangster were to some extent a function of this lack of access to a CNIC:

> The biggest challenge is of the identity card, which NADRA refuses to make for us. The ID card is necessary to get a job in a factory and our parents also don't have ID cards either. If there is no CNIC then getting a job is not possible. We cannot buy a ticket to travel, children can't be admitted to school, we cannot get a birth certificate, if we get married we cannot sort out the nikahnama (marriage certificate), we can't open a bank account, cannot have a property in our name and we cannot lease a property in our name. When young boys cannot get their citizenship rights, and if they feel deprived, what pathways are left for them? In Ali Akbar Shah Goth there are dozens of boys who have already chosen a path of trouble. They are following the wrong path just as I am, and these boys who are here. What are we to do? . . . If we are walking along the police harasses us. When we don't have an ID card, they throw us in prison, and let us go once we pay them off. This is how government agencies treat us. When we work for the political party here, they too take advantage of us…. Life is hell for the Burmese Bengalis (Male respondent K, AASG, Karachi, 15/05/2015).

This person extorted protection money from local businesses, and was wanted in multiple cases of theft, robbery and assault by the police. Our researcher met him at his den. But his story was repeated many times over in AASG and in Afghan Basti. For example, a woman whose uncle was shot 5 times by the MQM workers for being a worker of a rival political party said the following:

> My uncle was associated with political activities because of scarcity of resources. My family faces the fate that it does because the state can't protect us [I don't expect the people who shot my uncle and bread earner to be caught]. We are not able to cover our basic needs and the state does not provide any relief in this regard. My uncle was attracted towards political activities because that's the only way he saw that he could get recognition and along with it, some money (female respondent S, AASG, Karachi, 18/01/2015).

Another woman, H in AASG - whose 38 year old husband was reportedly suffering from lung cancer - blamed the state for her husband's illness. In her view because her husband did not have a CNIC he had to work as a labourer at the local railway station, that destroyed his health.

The clinical explanation for her husband's poor health, or the exact nature of the diagnoses is not the question here. The question is how Pakistani state's policies in relation to the GWOT map on to lives of women like H or S or a man like K to produce acute cases of infrastructural violence, insofar as their violent lives are the outcome of being denied access to state and non-state infrastructure.

In Afghan basti too, the same story was repeated in terms of lack of access to CNIC and then absence of any health, education or water infrastructure. Passive infrastructural violence also manifests itself in terms of insecurity of housing, which was deemed to be imbricated with gendered violence and it also shifts to active modes in terms of the police surveillance and treatment of the populations, e.g.,

> The biggest violence in our lives is that we do not own the land we live on. We are threatened every day to evacuate this place. When we don't comply they use other ways like police raids and take our men to the prison for many days. Our houses are made of mud (you can see) which create problems in the heavy rain. We live in dirt and our children play in the dirt, and get sick. We don't have any hospital facility here. I think all the violence is because our lives are miserable. Being a woman I feel that women have no importance in men's lives. I see my neighbours and relatives beaten and abused by their men. But man is the pillar of home and the bread earner so we have to endure (Female respondent ISL-AA-F2, Afghan Basti, Circa 2014).

> I think men are more vulnerable in this community. We are insecure due to police, government, everything. We have to defend against all the threats towards the family. Yes we sometimes beat our women but in return we love them a lot too, even more than their expectations. . . . To some extent we are fairly sorted in terms of employment, but as far as role of police and govt. is concerned it is very difficult to have a peaceful day. Every morning we fear getting arrested by the police. On the other hand, we also know that we cannot ask anyone to help us against this police violence. Whatever we earn and save, we have to give that money to police and in return they don't file fake cases against us (Male Respondent F. Afghan Basti, Islamabad, Circa 2014).

As the above quotes illustrate, the material conditions of deprivation and the internalization of the gender roles combine to form a violent environment. Most of the men work in the nearby vegetable market and face routinized public violence, not just in relation to their ethnicity, which we will discuss later, but also by virtue of their class. This is not irrelevant to the gendered violence that occurs within the households as described in the above quote. As aforementioned, the GWOT and the Taliban insurgency are often equated by the Pakistani elite and state actors with the Pashtun ethnic groups. The police harassment of Pashtuns in particular in Rawalpindi/Islamabad as well as Karachi is a function of equating Pashtun ethnicity with the Taliban—even though there is a sizeable representation of the dominant Punjabi ethnicity amongst their ranks (Rana 2004). The harassment is illustrative of the DNA relationality, where stereotype driven by global scale processes, contributes to everyday violence. Figure 3, is a photo taken by one of our male participatory photography participants in Afghan Abadi. It shows a policeman being followed like the pied piper, by street children with sacks. The policeman routinely turns over vendors stalls and carts for one violation or another, or for non-payment of bribes. The street children have seen it often enough to follow

the policeman so that they can pick off any fruits and vegetables that fall to the ground as the carts and stalls are turned over. This type of routinized violence also in a DNA like structure links to the extreme paranoia about female sexuality and almost draconian measures to control female mobility, even if it means subjecting elder men and women to back-breaking labour of fetching water or fuel (Figure 4), e.g.:

> Our men will kill us [if we went out]. A young woman is not allowed to go out. These jobs [of fetching water and fuel] can only be done by either men or by old women of the family (Female respondent N, Afghan Basti, Circa 2014).

Figure 3: A policeman being followed by street children in the vegetable market where most of the Afghan basti men, work as laborers and vendors (Source: Faisal).

Figure 4: An elderly man collecting coal bricks for fuel in Afghan Abadi (Source: Faisal).

The above is an illustration of twin affective and material strands that link local scale violence caused by bruised masculinities and exclusion from accessing infrastructure, respectively, with global scale war on terror.

The interlinkages between the GWOT and infrastructural violence do not all stem from questions of correct documentation. The interlinkages also emanate from the cultural change that has been brought on in Pakistan as a result of its antecedent to post 911 GWOT, involvement with the Saudi and American funded Afghan Jihad against the Soviets in the 1980s. Starting with the ingress of more rightist literalist Islam with Saudi funded madrasas in the 1980-90s (Abbas 2005, Rashid 2009), in the post 911 era, the battle lines of identity pan-Islamic religious identity have been drawn much more categorically as documented by Maqsood (2014). The more rightist literalist Islam has found its votaries in the first instance with the urban middle classes. This religious strand within the DNA like relationality between the global and local scale, inflects access to infrastructure, as this 18 year old woman, pregnant with her 7th child (she insists she is 18 and it is her 7th child) narrated, when asked if she would prefer to give birth in a hospital.

> I have heard that when women recite “dua darood” [A customary prayer used by Sufism inspired Muslims. Orthodox deem it to be un-Islamic], the nurses curse the woman. Mohajir women [who are typically better off] yell and abuse the patients more than any Bengali staff. They say, ‘if you are in so much pain why did you bear a child, why did you have sex with your husband?’ And other foul thing. I pray to Allah

> that He keep me safe from the hospital. . . . I have begged my husband that whatever happens to me, do not take me to the hospital, not even if I am dying (Woman respondent A, AASG, Karachi, 23/01/15).

Verbal abuse, and threats of violence are also violence, and in this instance, can be conceptualized as infrastructural violence, insofar as the need to access that infrastructure gets imbricated with violence. The nurses that disapprove of 'dua darood' may very well be inspired by the rightist literalist Islamic movements in the country, that have made significant ingress among the middle classes (Ahmad 2008). The religious angle when intersecting with class dynamics infuses the palliative infrastructure of a hospital with violence. The infrastructural violence, however is also complemented by spectacular gendered violence, much the same as the more national and international scale terrorist violence.

Spectacular Violence and the GWOT

Following Arendt's theorisation, everyday violence in the AASG and Afghan Basti is borne of a loss of power. Das (1996) demonstrates how the Indian state normalizes sexual violence through its judicial practices, where the women's bodies are produced at the intersection of discourses on sexuality and male kinship alliances. The female and male bodies are indeed sites of contestation over citizenship, masculinity and femininity, and the violence visited upon them changes the agency and texture of spaces and places within these communities. The link between global terrorist and everyday violence is again evocative of the DNA relationality that we have posited above. Violence in the two neighbourhoods of Afghan Basti and AASG, like terrorist violence uses a visual grammar of shock and awe to diminish the agency of the victims as political subjects, but simultaneously it eviscerates the perpetrators as legitimate protectors of female virtue, or ethnic identity (see Pain 2015). In fact, in the spectacles of violence enacted in the two neighbourhoods, there is almost an aspect of sublime violence whereby the, "perpetrators and victims transform themselves into instruments of forces that are believed to be greater than themselves" (Verkaaik 2013: 111).

One of the strategies of threatened masculinities in Afghan Basti of control over women is their almost complete restriction to the private sphere, as discussed in the previous section. This control is enforced through intense physical violence, which because of the very geographies in which it is enacted gives it a very public characteristic, e.g.,

> We are spending our lives like prisoners here. We are prisoners without being in a proper prison. We can't even take a single step without getting permission from our men. My husband beats me like an animal without any reason, in front of the whole family, including children. It's not only about me, my sister in law is also facing the same issues. We don't have any self-respect. We are like the men's servants. Important thing is that my mother in law also encourages her son and participates in abusing and beating us (Female respondent Z, Afghan Basti, Circa 2014).

Such intentionally spectacular violence doesn't just serve as a mode of control and constriction of spaces for female agency, but also as an enactment of masculinity in an environment where the masculinity itself is deeply eviscerated by the state. Achilli (2015) discusses a comparable situation of the hegemonic masculinities in the Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan, where aggression and violence become a marker of distinguishing one's

masculinity as superior in some ways to the dominant trans-Jordanian masculinity. The aggressive or pious, Palestinian camp masculinity, however, exists in a tension with the more feminine masculinity requiring docility and compliance in the face of the Jordanian state and society (Achilli 2015). The spectacular violence here, on the one hand serves to underline the aggressive, in control, masculinity of the men, and on the other serve as a warning to everyone else. The undercurrent in the enactment of that masculinity is the complete docility in the face of the state and its security apparatus, necessitated in no small part by GWOT.

In AASG, the relationship between MQM, the state and the populace is another dynamic deeply imbricated with the GWOT. MQM, as discussed above, positions itself a secular ethno-nationalist party, which found favour with the pro-US military government of General Pervaiz Musharraf in the 2000s. Although it is currently out of favour with the government, its links to western intelligence agencies and patronage, in particular by British intelligence is an open secret (Bennett-Jones 2013). MQM was not averse to public humiliation and gendered violence, beyond target killings to affirm its control of public spaces and to chastise the populace about the futility of resistance against its control (Verkaaik 2013). One of our respondents had to abandon going to school, partly because she was harassed by MQM workers for being the niece of an opposition party worker. Her uncle was killed by an MQM hitman:

> After [my brother's] departure [to Bahrain], MQM workers harassed us, especially me. When I went to school, MQM workers standing in the lane would shout, 'look! Look! Alam's niece is going to school!' As long as my father was keeping good health, I could go to school. But when he became ill [and couldn't protect us, or provide for us], I had to discontinue my education (Female participant H, AASG, Karachi, 1/18/2015).

Such harassment and taunting of the girl did not serve any particular function, beyond serving as a warning to others of what happens to the families of people who dare challenge the writ of the party. So pervasive was the impression of the efficacy of the MQM in perpetrating violence that even in familial feuds, the MQM could intervene, or was perceived to have the ability to intervene on the side of one of the parties, or the other. One of our respondents was subjected to a public beating based upon a false rumour that she had commissioned to have her estranged husband killed off by the MQM. She hadn't, and he was alive:

> [My former husband's sisters] dragged me into the street by my hair and beat me up. My mother was expecting at the time and she miscarried in all the jostling. They were beating me and crying loudly (Female respondent H, AASG, 21/01/2015).

In a culture of violence, where everyone's life and dignity is under threat, rumours about someone being killed by the MQM, were deemed credible. It was also credible that her estranged wife had commissioned the killing, especially since the husband himself was accused of killing someone else on a personal matter, and was technically in hiding. And then it was also quite opportune that the family of the husband deemed it fit to attack the woman's house in a state of rage and grief, and subject her and her mother to torture in a public way. Such spectacles, along with many, many others narrated to us paint a picture of a social milieu where gendered violence is the currency of negotiating personal and social conflict. The violent spectacle and its context are mutually co-constituted, as local to national scale political, institutional and affective strands linking the spaces of gendered violence across

local and global scales (Pain 2015, Fluri . The spectacle of violence is combined with an extreme difficulty in making claims upon the state or society for protection. The politics of appearance in the Arendtian sense (1973) or the politics of negotiating relationship between the individual and the state are deeply dysfunctional in this context. So, all that is left for the actors is to engage in the subliminal spectacle of violence, much the same as the actors at the national and international scale (Verkaaik 2013). In the current scenario, local citizens hold very little hope, if any, for other avenues of protection, or access to basic citizenship rights.

Conclusion

The violence visited upon the Pashtun women's bodies is not separate from the evisceration of the Pashtun masculinity by state violence. The pervasive gendered violence in the Rohingya community is deeply intertwined with the state's delegitimizing of the Rohingya identity as foreign, and the MQM's appropriation of their bodies to achieve politico-criminal ends. In either case, the loss of power underlying gendered violence is imbricated with the: politics of non-recognition by the state; affects of unfulfilled gendered expectations of men as breadwinners or women as caregivers; cultural tropes of urban consumerist expectations in the city; and encounters with the state. We have tried to demonstrate how the politics, affects, cultural tropes and encounters, instead of being in a stable nested hierarchy, weave into a double helix like structure representing the DNA like relationality between the local every day violence, and the national and global geopolitics. The war on terror and everyday violence are co-produced, and we have presented evidence to the effect of how they are in Pakistan.

The co-productive relation between the GWOT for example, and everyday terror is illustrated more subtly by infrastructural violence of exclusion from access to state services, or impregnation of those services with violence. The relational linkage between terrorism and everyday violence is a theme running through our argument, but it comes into sharp focus in the discussion on creation of different masculinities and femininities. How contemporary Pashtun and Bengali/Rohingya masculinities are enacted violently is mediated by the history of reinforcing certain orientalist gender stereotypes in the context of GWOT on the one hand, and the compulsions of participation in a capitalist economy on the other.

Every day violence mimics the spatial strategies of spectacular violence most closely associated with international terror. Gendered violence is enacted both privately and publicly, and in the register of redeeming some masculine authority in the face of eviscerating state violence. Terrorist violence, similarly is enacted in the face of a West that has dealt all political cards to itself, leaving anyone outside of its ontological truth regimes the only weapon available, the (apolitical) spectacle (Jones and Clarke 2006: 307).

State, non-state, criminal and domestic violence all are co-constituted, gendered and intersectional. The spatial strategies of violence at the local every day and episodic national and international terror are ultimately about constricting spaces for public life (Mustafa *et al*. 2013). The younger women in Afghan Basti are denied access to the public sphere, young men's experience of certain spaces is deeply intertwined with violence. If there is a villain that emerges in this violent spatial drama, it is the state that through its spatial strategies of exclusion, control, and recognition sustains the violent gendered geographies, both at the

everyday level and the scale of global terror. Any discussion of global terror and every day violence, must start with that recognition.

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Declaration of Interest

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Yours Sincerely



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